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TITLE III-RECALCITRANT WITNESSES
I. CODIFICATION OF PRESENT PRACTICE
This title represents a congressional attempt to codify the
court-developed' civil contempt practice. 2 When a witness is
granted immunity and still refuses to answer the question present-
ed to him he can be ordered by a court to answer the specific
question.3 Upon his continued refusal, a court can have him
confined summarily until he complies with such order, or until he
is no longer able to comply. 4 Such confinement is not intended to
be punitive in nature, 5 but rather to coerce compliance with the
court's order by imposing imprisonment as an alternative to an-
swering the question. 6 The witness will be released from con-
finement as soon as he is willing to obey the court order. 7 Con-
sequently, he is said to carry "the keys of [his] prison in [his] own
pockets." 8 Since the confinement is based on the witness' refusal
to comply, however, he may not be jailed after it is impossible for
him effectively to carry out the court's order, i.e., after the rele-
vant proceeding has terminated.9 As a result of the purpose of the
I "There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with
their lawful orders through civil contempt." Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370
(1966);See also In re Loughran, 276 F. Supp. 393, 401 (C.D. Cal. 1967); In re Lazarus,
276 F. Supp. 434, 447, 449 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
2 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]; S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
3 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Giancana, 352 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); United States v. Coplon, 339 F.2d 192, 193 (6th
Cir. 1964). See also In re Grand Jury Testimony of Kinoy, No. M-11-188, at 7-8
(S.D.N.Y., Jan. 29, 1971) (due process requires witness to be able to ascertain which
questions are covered within the scope of an immunity grant; therefore, witness entitled to
a prior ruling by the court on specific questions before he can be held in contempt).
4 See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966). In re Parker, 411
F.2d 1067, 1068 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970); United States v.
Krueger, 301 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); In re Lazarus, 276 F. Supp. 434, 442
(C.D. Cal. 1967).
5 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966). In re Grand Jury In-
vestigation of Giancana, 352 F.2d at 925; In re Lazarus, 276 F. Supp. 434, 448 (C.D. Cal.
1967). See HOUSE REPORT 46; SENATE REPORT 148.
6 See note 5 supra.
7 In re Lazarus, 276 F. Supp. 434, 450 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Shillitani v. United States, 384
U.S. 364, 368 (1966); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1068 (10th Cir. 1969). See HOUSE
REPORT 46; SENATE REPORT 148.
8 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. at 368 (1966); In re Nevitt, l17 F. 448, 461 (8th
Cir. 1902); United States v. Krueger, 301 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); See
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 55 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled in
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965).
9 See note 4 supra.
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confinement and its particular features, the remedy is considered
civil in nature, and the witness is not entitled to the same proce-
dural protections that are provided for the defendant accused of a
criminal act. Thus, an indictment and jury trial are not within the
due process requirements which must be afforded the recalcitrant
witness. 10
II. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
The present codification applies to "any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States."" As in
title II, a proceeding "ancillary to" a court would include a
pre-trial deposition hearing.' 2 As was noted in the discussion of
title II, the immunity provision was designed to include within its
scope "testimony or other information"'3 (emphasis added). Like-
wise, the contempt provision may be applied for the failure of the
witness to provide, in addition to testimony, "other information"
including books, records, or other material.'
4
Consistent with the court imposed restraints on civil con-
tempt, 15 the statute prohibits confinement, with respect to court
proceedings, in excess of the life of the proceeding.' 6 With respect
to grand jury proceedings, confinement is limited to the term of
the grand jury, including extensions, but not in excess of eighteen
months.'
7
The Senate version of the Act did not contain the eighteen
month limitation.' 8 Prior to the Organized Crime Control Act, a
grand jury was authorized to sit for a maximum of only eighteen
months.' 9 Because a special grand jury created by the Act can sit
for up to thirty-six months, 20 the Senate version was criticized for
authorizing possible summary confinement for this extended peri-
10 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. at 371 (1966); Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388,
403-04 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). However, when a witness is cited for criminal
contempt, a jury trial must be available for the witness to be sentenced in excess of six
months. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194, 208 (1968) (right to jury trial fundamental in criminal contempt cases; that is, if not
petty crime). See also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969). But see United States
v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1970) (citation for criminal contempt for three year
sentence-neither jury trial nor indictment required), cert. pending, Bukowski v. United
States, 39 U.S.L.W. 3339 (No. 968, petition for cert. filed Nov. 13, 1970).
" 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a) (Supp. 1971).
12 HOUSE REPORT 46; SENATE REPORT 148.
13See TITLE Il-GENERAL IMMUNITY, n. 10.
14 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a) (Supp. 1971); HOUSE REPORT 46; SENATE REPORT 148.
15 See note 4 supra.
16 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
17 Id. § 1826(a)(2).
1s See proposed § 301(a), reprinted in SENATE REPORT II.
19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g).
2018 U.S.C.A. § 3331(a) (Supp. 1971). SeeTITLE I-SPECIAL GRAND JURY, n.
12 and accompanying text.
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od of time2 l contrary to the existing practice.2 2 The House sub-
sequently imposed the eighteen month limitation.23 There is no
limitation, however, on confinement to the original term of the
grand jury. Thus, a recalcitrant witness may be summarily jailed
for either eighteen months or until the special grand jury proceed-
ings (including any extensions) are terminated, whichever occurs
first.2 4 Since a witness prior to the passage of the Act could be
held only until the end of the grand jury's maximum term. of
eighteen months, he would, under the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, be less inclined to refuse compliance with an order
to testify toward the end of the special grand jury's original term;
he would still face the possibility of confinement for a total of
eighteen months, as the special grand jury may have its term
extended up to a maximum of thirty-six months. 2 5
When the witness is before a court proceeding, the eighteen
month limitation does not apply.2 6 Since "court proceeding" is not
specifically defined, some have expressed fear that the phrase
could be interpreted to include all appeals subsequent to trial, and
thus subject the witness to confinement for a period of time which
21 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 494 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings] (statement of Lawrence Speiser, then Director, Washington
Office, American Civil Liberties Union); "Ifa person has refused to speak for a long time,
there is little likelihood that he will change his mind. Further confinement becomes
punitive not coercive, and should not be permitted without a complete trial for criminal
contempt of court." 116 CONG. REC. H9670 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970) (statement of
Lawrence Speiser). See also COMM. ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE PROPOSED ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF
1969 (S. 30) (1970), reprinted in House Hearings 293, at 307 [hereinafter cited as
ABCNY]. See generally McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act, 46 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 55, 89 (1970); HOUSE REPORT 46; United States v. Doe, 405 F.2d 436, 438 (2d.
Cir. 1968); cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 n.9 (1966).
22 However, in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 n.8, after holding that the
witness could not be confined beyond the term of the grand jury, the Court remarked: "By
the same token, the sentences of imprisonment may be continued or reimposed if the
witnesses adhere to their refusal to testify before a successor grand jury." To the extent
that this comment would be interpreted to allow coercive confinement in excess of
eighteen months, the original Senate proposal does not seem to alter the present practice.
2 HOUSE REPORT 46; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a)(2) (Supp. 1971). It appears unclear from
the history to what extent the House amendment was intended to negate the implication
from Mr. Justice Clark's footnote, (see note 22 supra) that coercive confinement may be
continued for extended periods by calling a recalcitrant witness before a successor grand
jury and demanding a response to the identical questions that originally resulted in his
confinement. It is possible to interpret the House amendment as reflecting a congressional
judgment that civil confinement in excess of eighteen months becomes punitive instead of
coercive, requiring a discontinuance of the civil remedy. If this is to be the rationale, then
it should equally apply to successor grand juries, limiting the total period of coercive
confinement to eighteen months. Upon such a subsequent refusal, a court may charge the
witness with criminal contempt (cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. at 371 n.9
(1966)).
24 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a)(2) (Supp. 1971); HOUSE REPORT 46.
25 18 U.S.C.A. § 333 1(a) (Supp. 1971).
26 28 U.S.C.A. § 18 26(a) (Supp. 1971).
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could last many years.2 7 However, discussion in the House Hear-
ings indicate that this provision would only authorize confinement
until a trial court lost jurisdiction when an appeal was taken. At
that point the relevant proceeding would be completed, as the
witness would no longer be able to purge himself of his contempt
and come forth and testify.2 8
III. BAIL
The title also specifically provides for bail pending an appeal of
a confinement order under this section.2 9 A discretionary stan-
dard3" is instituted to conform to the standard in Rule 46(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 l and presumably the
Bail Reform Act.3 2 The statute provides that bail shall be denied
"if it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay"33
(emphasis added). The statute also calls for the disposition of
these appeals "as soon as practicable, but not later than thirty
days from the filing of such appeal." 34
When the bill first passed the Senate, it contained a more
restrictive standard for bail pending the appeal of a confinement
order for civil contempt.3 5 Bail was to be denied unless there was
a "substantial possibility of reversal" on appeal3 6 This standard
was believed to shift the burden of showing whether bail should
be granted from the Government3 7 to the contemner. Those in
support of this standard viewed bail on appeal as defeating the
27 See 116 CONG. REC. H9670 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970) (statement of Lawrence Speiser,
Director, Washington Office, American Civil Liberties Union). See also House Hearings
630-31.
28 House Hearings 630- 3 1.
29 28 U.S.C.A. §1826(b) (Supp. 1971).
30 HOUSE REPORT 33.
31 Id. 46. Although the civil contempt proceeding is civil in nature, courts have applied
the standard enunciated in Rule 46(a)(2) for determinations of bail on appeal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coplon, 339 F.2d 192, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1964). See also ABCNY, supra
note 21, at 307-08. The codification now resolves any questions as to the use of this
standard by applying it, in its own right, to this civil proceeding.
32 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp. IV, 1969).
3328 U.S.C.A. § 1826(b) (Supp. 1971). Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(2), which
states in part: "Bail may be allowed pending appeal ... unless it appears that the appeal is
frivolous or taken for delay." See also 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp. IV, 1969) (Bail Reform
Act of 1966) which states in part: "if it appears that an appeal is frivolous or taken for
delay, the person may be ordered detained." Cf. Proposed Rule 46, FED. R. CRIM. P., in
48 F.R.D. 553, 634-39 (1970) (eliminating the present 46(a)(2), reaffirming reliance on the
standard in 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp. IV, 1969).
34 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(b). (Supp. 1971).
' See ABCNY, supra note 21, at 308-09; SENATE REPORT 33, 149.
38 See Proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b), reprinted in SENATE REPORT 11. See also SENATE
REPORT 149.
3 7See, e.g., United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 741 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (under Rule
46, burden on Government to show bail pending appeal should be denied); see also
Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1960).
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coercive purpose of civil confinement. 38 However, the House
Committee rejected this standard and chose instead the more
lenient guideline 39 used to determine whether to grant bail during
criminal appeals.
40
However, in moving to the standard employed in determining
whether bail should be granted pending an appeal of a criminal
conviction, Congress has failed to clarify its precise intent. The
inherent difference between the civil contempt proceeding and a
criminal appeal might well lead to courts interpreting this codifica-
tion in two different manners. In the case of a criminal conviction,
of course, a fixed sentence is imposed. After an affirmance, the
full sentence must be served (assuming the defendant has been
out on bail).41 When civil confinement is-imposed, however, the
maximum internment has been limited by the life of the grand
jury. In this situation, bail pending appeal would tend to reduce
the confinement period. Therefore, in determining whether to
grant bail, a district court could consider all appeals to be for
"purposes of delay," regardless of whether they were nonfri-
volous, and deny bail on that basis.42 Other courts could apply the
spirit of the criminal standard, 43 and grant bail more frequently
than their counterparts who employed a literal interpretation.
Considering the special nature of the civil contempt proceeding, a
meaningful bail standard should probably be phrased solely in
terms of frivolity.
44
Yet, the requirement that appeals be disposed of as soon as
practicable, and within a maximum of thirty days5 may encour-
age courts to grant bail in civil contempt appeals more frequently.
Such a provision minimizes any reduction in confinement a wit-
ness might gain from bail on appeal and to this extent would not
tend to defeat the coercive purpose of confinement. Thus the
determination of whether to grant bail pending appeal could be
3a See House Hearings 633.
39 For an analysis of the distinction between these standards, see ABCNY supra note
21, at 307-08; House Hearings 633.
40 See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
41 Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,718- 19 (1969).
42 Note that the standard uses the disjunctive "or" ("if it appears that the appeal is
frivolous or taken for delay" (emphasis added) ).
43 See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bail Reform
Act plainly favors release); United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 741 (N.D. Tex.
1964) (trend since 1956 amendment to Rule 46 toward liberalization of allowance of bail);
see also United States v. Ursini, 276 F. Supp. 993, 997 (D. Conn. 1967).
44See United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 740 (N.D. Tex. 1964): "An appeal is
said to be 'frivolous' where it presents no debatable question or no reasonable possibility
of reversal, the word meaning of little weight or importance, not worth notice, slight
[citation omitted]." See also United States v. Martone, 283 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D.P.R. 1968).
428 U.S.C.A. § 1826(b) (Supp. 1971).
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based upon the same considerations that a court would base its
determination of whether to grant bail during the pendency of a
criminal appeal.
IV. UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION
This title also amends the Interstate Flight to Avoid Prose-
cution Act 46 to include witnesses who flee from state criminal
investigative commissions to avoid giving testimony, and wit-
nesses who are subject to contempt proceedings for failing to give
such testimony.47 Prior to the amendment, the statute made it a
federal offense to flee a state's jurisdiction to avoid criminal pro-
cess or the giving of testimony in a criminal proceeding.
48 It
provided a jurisdictional basis for federal law enforcement officials
to act 49 where state officials could not, except in accordance with
the lengthy process of state extradition.5" The amendment now
extends this jurisdictional base to include those who move in
interstate commerce with the intent "to avoid service of, or con-
tempt proceedings for alleged disobedience of, lawful process
requiring attendance and the giving of testimony or the production
of documentary evidence before an agency of a state empowered
by the law of such state to conduct investigations of alleged
criminal activities." 51 The venue for such a violation would lie in
the district in which the avoidance of the service of process or
contempt occurred.
52
- 18 U.S.(. j 1073 (1964).
41 See HOUSE REPORT 33, 46; SENATE REPORT 149.
48 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1964).
49 HOUSE REPORT 46.
'0 See House Hearings 100 (statement of Senator McClellan).
51 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 302(a), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073 (Supp. 197 1).
5 2 1d. § 302(b), 18 U.S.C.A. § 107-3-(S--p. 197'f)-.See HOUSE REPORT 46.
SPRING 197 1]
